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This paper investigates the role of collateral and personal guarantees in small business lending 
using the unique data set of Japan’s small business loan market. Consistent with conventional 
theory, collateral is more likely to be pledged by riskier borrowers, implying they may be useful 
in mitigating debtor moral hazard. Contrary to conventional theory, we find that banks whose 
claims are either collateralized or personally guaranteed monitor borrowers more frequently. We 
also find that borrowers who establish long-term relationships with their main banks are more 
likely to pledge collateral. Our empirical evidence thus suggests that collateral and personal 
guarantees are complementary to relationship lending.   
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1 Introduction 
Recent literature on financial intermediation has focused on the role of banks as relationship 
lenders. Relationship lending has also received close attention by policymakers and the business 
community in Japan recently, following publication of the “Action Program Concerning 
Enhancement of Relationship Banking Functions” by Japan’s Financial Services Agency in 
March 2003. The background paper of the Program argues that relationship banking has not 
been working effectively in Japan and it cites the intensive use of collateral and personal 
guarantees in small business lending as a typical example of Japanese banks’ incompetence. The 
implicit assumption in this argument is that collateral and personal guarantees are incompatible 
with relationship lending, which requires intensive screening and monitoring of borrowers on 
whom information tends to be scarce and opaque. This assumption is based on the widely held 
view that during the “bubble economy” of the late 1980s when real estate prices were escalating 
rapidly, Japanese banks relied too heavily upon the value of real estate collateral in making 
loans to businesses and hence lost their screening and monitoring ability. On the other hand, the 
conventional wisdom among Japanese bankers is that banks do screen and monitor borrowers 
more intensively following the bursting of the bubble economy because they can no longer rely 
on the value of real estate collateral. If this conventional wisdom is true, collateral is likely to be 
used as a tool for credit enhancement, which may complement rather than substitute for 
screening and monitoring activities by banks.   
This paper studies the role and determinants of collateral and personal guarantees in relationship 
lending using the unique data set of Japan’s small business loan market. In particular, we are 
interested in whether the use of collateral and personal guarantees is in fact incompatible with 
screening and monitoring by the relationship lender. We argue that collateral and personal 
guarantees do play a positive role in relationship lending. 
The intensive use of collateral and personal guarantees in small business lending is not 
uncommon in other developed countries. For instance, using the 1993 “National Survey of 
Small Business Finances in the United States,” Berger and Udell (1998) argue that most small 
business loans are personally guaranteed by the business owners and in many cases, the 
business assets as well as the personal assets of insiders are explicitly pledged as collateral to 
back the loan. 
A number of theoretical and empirical studies have examined the uses of collateral and personal 
guarantees in loan contracts. Given asymmetric information between creditors and borrowers, 
collateral and personal guarantees may mitigate the problem of adverse selection (Bester, 1985; 
1987) and the problem of moral hazard (Bester, 1994; Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991). 
Collateral and personal guarantees also affect the incentives of creditors, as they will either 
substitute for or complement information production by financial intermediaries (Manove, 
Padilla, and Pagano, 2001; Rajan and Winton, 1995; Boot 2000; Longhofer and Santos, 2000). 
The presence of collateral and personal guarantees may also depend on the length and intimacy 
of the relationship between creditors and borrowers (Boot, 2000; Boot and Thakor, 1994; 
Sharpe, 1990). The use of collateral and personal guarantees, how it relates to the characteristics 
of borrowers and lenders, and the relationship between the two parties remain unclear; empirical 
research has yet to reach decisive conclusions about the nature of this relationship. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature on collateral and personal guarantees 
using the unique data set of Japan’s small business loan market. We are interested in how the 
use of collateral and personal guarantees affects the incentives of debtors, lenders, and the 
relationship between them. More specifically, the paper examines the following three   2
conventional theories. First, the paper examines whether collateral and personal guarantees are 
required for riskier borrowers in order to limit the extent of debtor moral hazard after loans are 
made. Although it does not necessarily contradict the conventional wisdom, some argue that 
collateral and personal guarantees are more likely to be pledged by less risky borrowers so as to 
prevent the problem of adverse selection in loan contracts. We test both hypotheses in turn. 
Second, the paper investigates whether collateral and personal guarantees may substitute for the 
bank’s information production activities, such as screening and monitoring of borrowers (the 
“lazy bank” hypothesis). Contrary to this conventional theory, several theoretical studies, which 
we review briefly below, argue that collateral and personal guarantees may instead complement 
screening and monitoring activities by the lender. We empirically assess which hypothesis holds 
in Japan’s small business lending market. Third, we examine the correlation between the use of 
collateral and personal guarantees and the closeness of the bank-borrower relationship. The 
current belief among Japanese policymakers and business leaders is that there is less use of 
collateral and personal guarantees if loans are based on solid relationships between lenders and 
borrowers. This belief is reflected in the Japan Financial Services Agency’s Action Program. On 
the other hand, if collateral and personal guarantees are complementary to screening and 
monitoring by the relationship-lender, it would be natural to see the opposite correlation. We 
also test these hypotheses. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical and empirical literature on 
collateral and personal guarantees in loan contracts. Section 3 describes the data used in this 
paper. Section 4 presents our empirical results. First, we take preliminary overviews on how the 
risk of the borrower, the degree of screening and monitoring by the lender, and the relationship 
between the two would affect the use of collateral and personal guarantees. Then, we present 
our estimation models and empirical results. Section 5 summarizes our key findings. 
2  Literature review on the role of collateral and personal guarantees   
2.1  Role of collateral under perfect information 
The role of collateral and personal guarantees differs completely, depending upon whether or 
not there is information asymmetry between creditors and borrowers. To see this point, it is 
useful to consider first the situation where creditors have perfect information on borrowers. For 
convenience, we use the term “collateral” for both collateral and personal guarantees
1. 
The exposition is a simplified version of the seminal work by Bester (1985). We consider two 
types of risk-neutral entrepreneurs, G and B, whose projects are distinguished by their riskiness. 
Both projects require the same amount of capital to carry out, and we assume the required 
amount of capital is a unity. The returns to the projects are  G R  and  B R ( B G R R < ) if they 
                                                      
1  To be precise, collateral is typically physical assets or securities that the creditor can sell in the event of 
the borrower’s default. In many cases, the assets or securities pledged as collateral are owned by the 
borrowing firm (inside collateral) and hence do not increase the potential losses that the borrower may 
suffer. Inside collateral mainly defines the order of seniority among creditors in the case of bankruptcy, 
although it also deters the use of perks by the borrower. On the other hand, a personal guarantee refers to 
a contractual obligation of the business owner or other third parties, such as the relatives of the owner or 
directors of the borrowing firm, to repay the principal in the event of a default. If the borrowing firm is a 
limited liability entity, a personal guarantee functions as outside collateral, except that it does not give 
control over specific assets. Most of the theoretical literature, as well as our exposition below, explicitly 
or implicitly assumes collateral is outside, but it is often difficult to discriminate between inside and 
outside collateral in empirical analyses due to the lack of information.     3
succeed and 0 if they fail. The probability of success is given by  G P  and  B P ( B G P P > ), 
respectively. Entrepreneurs finance their projects by borrowing from a bank whose loan contract 
is specified by the interest rate r and the amount of collateral C . Entrepreneurs face 
collateralization costs, which are assumed to be proportional to the amount of collateral by a 
factork . For simplicity, there is only one risk-neutral bank that gains all social surpluses. 
The expected profits of an entrepreneuri  ( ) ,B G i =   are given by: 
  i i i i i i i C k P kC r R P X ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( + − − − − =  (1) 
The expected profits of a bank for a loan contract with entrepreneuri are given by: 
  i i i i i C P r P Z ) 1 ( − + ⋅ =  (2) 
Because the bank is a monopolist, it will set the terms of loan contracts to maximize the 
expected profit, making the expected profit of each entrepreneur zero. Because the bank can 
distinguish the riskiness of borrowers under perfect information, the bank will charge different 
interest rates and impose different collateral requirements on each entrepreneur. If there is no 
collateral, the interest rate is set at  i i R r =  and the bank will earn  i iR P ( 0 = i X ). On the other 














  and the bank will earn  i i i kC R P − . Hence, under perfect information, 
the bank will not require collateral. This result obtains because a social cost accrues in 
registering and managing collateral. 
Alternatively, the bank will not require collateral under perfect information when there is no 
collateralization cost but entrepreneurs are risk averse, because, from the viewpoint of an 
entrepreneur, increasing the loss if the project fails by providing collateral and increasing gain if 
the project succeeds by reducing interest payments is incompatible with risk-averseness (Bester, 
1987). In other words, risk-averse entrepreneurs would buy complete insurance if there were 
actuarially fair insurance available. In the absence of such insurance, an entrepreneur would 
prefer a loan contract without collateral as a second-best choice so as to minimize the difference 
between the payoff if the project succeeds and the payoff if the project fails. 
2.2  Role of collateral under asymmetric information 
Riskiness of the borrower 
The above result will be quite different if the bank cannot discern the riskiness of the 
entrepreneurs (hidden information). Under informational asymmetry, collateral can serve as a 
screening device in order to discern the riskiness of entrepreneurs. This follows from the 
observation that the marginal rate of substitution (willingness to exchange interest payment for 
collateral loss if default occurs) for the riskier entrepreneur is higher (in absolute value) than 











Hence, the lower-risk entrepreneurG has a relatively larger incentive to pledge collateral than 
the risky entrepreneur B , because of his lower probability of failure and loss of collateral.   4
The incentive compatibility constraint requires the bank to offer the first-best contract to the 
riskier entrepreneur, B, who has an incentive to act as if he were type G. Hence, as is the case 
under perfect information, the loan contract with the riskier entrepreneur entails no collateral. 
Regarding the type G borrower, the bank will offer a contract with “minimum” collateral
2 so  as 
to satisfy to the following incentive compatibility constraint of the type B borrower: 
  ) 0 , ( ) , ( = = ≤ B B B B G G B C R r X C r X  (4) 
As a result, collateral serves as a screening device to discriminate based on the riskiness of the 
borrower, and to mitigate the adverse selection problem. The lower-risk borrower will choose 
the contract with collateral, in order to take advantage of the lower interest rate. 
On the other hand, when the information asymmetry is in the form of hidden action, in which 
the lender cannot observe actions taken by a borrower after the loan is originated, collateral can 
be used as an incentive to mitigate the moral hazard problem. For example, Boot, Thakor, and 
Udell (1991) argue that if a project’s probability of success depends on the degree of effort by 
the borrower — which is unobservable by the creditor — and the marginal impact of effort on 
the probability of success decreases with borrower quality (that is, riskier entrepreneurs have a 
higher marginal “return” to effort), then it is optimal for the lender to require collateral from the 
riskier borrowers in order to limit moral hazard (a lack of effort on the part of the borrower). 
Similarly, Bester (1994) considers the situation where the creditors cannot directly observe the 
project outcome and hence cannot distinguish whether the borrower defaults strategically or 
because he is actually unable to meet his debt obligations. Under this constraint, collateral 
reduces the debtor’s incentive for voluntary default. Because in equilibrium the incentive to 
strategically default is negatively correlated with risk, the riskier borrower is more likely to be 
financed thorough loan contracts that entail collateral than the lower-risk borrower. Contrary to 
the literature on hidden information, theoretical models of hidden action argue that the riskier 
entrepreneurs will obtain loans with collateral while the less risky ones obtain loans without 
collateral. One should note, however, that the theories of hidden information, in which the 
borrower’s risk is unobservable, and theories of hidden action, in which the borrower’s risk is 
observable but its actions are unobservable, are not mutually exclusive because they are based 
on different assumptions about the informational structure. 
Screening and Monitoring by the lender 
Recent literature on financial intermediation has focused on the role of banks as information 
providers: that is, screening the borrower’s project and monitoring its performance. Manove, 
Padilla, and Pagano (2001) argue that, from the banks’ point of view, collateral can be 
considered a substitute for evaluation of the actual risk of a borrower. Thus, banks that are 
highly protected by collateral may perform less screening of the projects they finance than is 
socially optimal (the lazy bank hypothesis). This idea is reflected in the Financial Services 
Agency’s Action Program, which urges banks to promote “lending activities [by] placing 
emphasis upon cash flow from business operations and by avoiding excessive dependence upon 
collateral and guarantees.” 
                                                      
2  In our setting, this reduces to 
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, which is lower than the first-best interest rate (without 
collateral) under perfect information. Note also that it is lower than the interest rate charged to the type B 
borrower.   5
However, several theoretical studies argue that collateral may complement screening and 
monitoring activities by the lender. For instance, in the presence of other claimants, the lender’s 
incentive to monitor the borrower is reduced due to the informational free-rider problem, among 
others. In order to enhance the lender’s incentive to monitor, loan contracts must be structured 
in a way that makes the lender’s payoff sensitive to the borrower’s financial health. Rajan and 
Winton (1995) argue that collateral may serve as a contractual device to increase the lender’s 
monitoring incentive, because collateral is likely to be effective only if its value can be 
monitored. Moreover, the use of collateral as an incentive will be more extensive when the 
value of such collateral depreciates rapidly according to business conditions (e.g., accounts 
receivable and inventories), than when the value of collateral is relatively stable
3 (e.g., real 
estate). As a corollary, Rajan and Winton also show that if the value of collateral is too high 
relative to the lender’s claim, the lender has no incentive to monitor because its claim is fully 
secured regardless of the borrower’s business conditions. 
The paper by Longhofer and Santos (2000) provides another explanation of how collateral may 
be complementary to screening and monitoring by banks. They point out that banks usually take 
senior positions on their small business loans. They further argue that the relationship-lending 
equilibrium, in which the lender establishes firm bank-firm relationships by investing in costly 
information production activities such as screening and monitoring, is more likely to exist when 
the relationship-lender (the bank) is senior to the firm’s other creditors, because the lender’s 
incentive to make such investments depends crucially on its payoff. If the bank is junior to other 
creditors, it gains little from additional investment in information production activities on the 
firm during times of poor performance, and hence has little incentive to make such investments. 
By making its loan senior to other creditors’ claims, the bank is able to reap the benefits of its 
relationship-building investments. Because taking collateral effectively raises the lender’s 
priority, this argument can easily apply to the use of collateral. 
Relationship between the borrower and the lender 
Banks and firms often maintain their relationship through multiple interactions over time and 
across products. Such relationships often involve borrower-specific information gathered by the 
bank through screening and monitoring. This information is thus proprietary and exclusive in 
nature. As a result, the borrower tends to maintain relations with only one bank. This type of 
lending is referred to as “relationship banking”
4 (Boot,  2000). 
By establishing a solid relationship with the borrower, the lender learns about the hidden 
attributes and actions of the borrower and reduces the information asymmetry. Hence the terms 
of loan contracts may become more favorable to the borrower if the firm has transactions with a 
specific relationship-lender over time. For example, Boot and Thakor (1994) construct a model 
in which collateral requirements are negatively correlated with the duration of bank-borrower 
relationship: Borrowers pledge collateral early in the relationship but do not pledge collateral 
after they have demonstrated success with several projects. 
                                                      
3  Another related benefit of using inventories and accounts receivable as collateral is that they may reveal 
valuable information about the business (Boot, 2000). This also shows the complementarities between 
collateral and information production by the financial intermediary. 
4  Relationship lending is quite different from “transactions-based lending,” where a lender focuses on a 
single transaction and hence maintains an arm’s-length relationship with a borrower. In the realm of small 
business lending, Berger and Udell (2002) cite financial statement lending, asset-based lending, and credit 
scoring lending as three forms of transactions-based lending.   6
Alternatively, relationship lending may enhance the use of collateral due to the hold-up 
problem: As the bank obtains the proprietary information about the borrower, the bank exerts its 
information monopoly by charging higher interest rates or requiring more collateral (Sharpe, 
1990). 
In contrast, the strand of literature that emphasizes the complementarities between collateral and 
screening and monitoring activities by the lender discussed in the previous subsection argues 
that collateral is an intrinsic component of relationship lending. This literature treats collateral 
as a necessary condition for the lender to invest in information production. Boot (2000) 
highlights another contribution of collateral in relationship lending: its role in mitigating the 
soft-budget constraint problem. The soft-budget constraint problem refers to a situation where 
the lender has difficulty in enforcing the loan contracts that may come with relationship lending. 
For example, consider the case where a borrower in difficulty asks the bank for more credit and 
reduced interest obligations in order to avoid default. Although a transaction-based lender 
would not lend to such a borrower, a relationship-lender that has already made loans might 
extend additional credit and lower the interest rate in the hope of recovering its previous loan. 
Once the borrower realizes he can renegotiate the loan contract relatively easily, he has an 
incentive to misbehave ex ante, such as by failing to make sufficient efforts to prevent the bad 
outcome (dynamic inconsistency). In such cases, collateral will increase the ex-post bargaining 
power of the lender and hence mitigate the soft-budget constraint problem because collateral 
makes the value of lender’s claim less sensitive to the borrower’s total net worth. The bank can 
credibly threaten to call in the loan and thus prevent misbehavior by the borrower. 
2.3 Empirical  evidence 
Because collateral has little role under perfect information, most empirical literature on 
collateral investigates the role of collateral under asymmetric information. This subsection 
reviews some of these empirical studies. 
Riskiness of the borrower 
There are several empirical studies that examine the relationship between collateral and the 
riskiness of the loan or the borrower. Berger and Udell (1990) investigate the relationship 
between collateral and credit risk by estimating the differences in risk premiums between 
secured and unsecured loans. If collateral serves as an incentive device that is designed to solve 
the problem of adverse selection, then the risk premium of the loan should be negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of collateral being pledged because a low-risk borrower would 
choose a contract with collateral, in order to take advantage of the lower risk premium. On the 
other hand, if the lender observes the ex-ante risk of the borrower and requires a higher-risk 
borrower to pledge collateral, then there should be a positive relationship between the risk 
premium and the presence of collateral. Berger and Udell (1990) find a positive association 
between use of collateral and risk premiums, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
collateral reduces debtor’s moral hazard. Similarly, Berger and Udell (1995) find a positive 
relationship between the leverage of the borrower, which is a proxy for borrower risk, and 
collateral, and thus confirm their earlier result.   
Pozzolo (2004) focuses on possible differences between the roles of inside and outside collateral 
(see footnote 1 for the definition of these terms). He argues that outside collateral is more 
effective in dealing with debtor incentive problems because it increases the value of assets that 
the lender can withhold in the event of default. Because it is difficult in practice to distinguish 
between inside and outside collateral due to data limitations, the study considers collateral (such   7
as physical assets or equities) as inside and personal guarantees as outside. Pozzolo (2004) uses 
a credit score, which measures the risk profile of the borrower, as a proxy for ex-ante borrower 
risk. The study finds no statistically significant relationship between collateral and borrower risk 
and interprets this result as potentially consistent with the idea that collateral mitigates the 
adverse selection problem, which deals with the unobservable riskiness of the borrower. The 
study also argues that collateral is not used as an incentive device for the moral hazard problem, 
presumably because such collateral is internal to the borrowing firm. The idea that internal 
collateral cannot serve as an incentive is supported by Elsas and Krahnen (2000), who find no 
statistically significant relationship between collateral and borrower quality.
5 In the case of 
personal guarantees (outside collateral), Pozzolo (2004) finds positive association between the 
two, implying that personal guarantees are used as an incentive in the presence of moral hazard. 
The study by Jiménez, Salas-Fumás, and Saurina (2004) directly tests the adverse selection 
hypothesis and the moral hazard hypothesis by separating the ex-ante and ex-post measures of 
borrower riskiness. The ex-ante riskiness of the borrower, which must be distinguished to 
examine moral hazard hypothesis, is measured by a default dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the borrower had previously defaulted on a loan at the time the new loan was made. As 
for the ex post-riskiness of the borrower, which is used to test the adverse selection hypothesis, 
the default variable takes the value of one if the borrower defaults on a loan after it is made. The 
authors find evidence supporting the moral hazard hypothesis. Brick, Kane and Palia (2004) 
obtain a similar result, using a default dummy variable for either the principal owner or the firm 
as a measure of the ex-ante riskiness of the borrower. 
Screening and Monitoring by the lender 
To our knowledge, little work has been done to empirically assess whether the use of collateral 
and personal guarantees are substitutive or complementary to screening and monitoring by the 
lender. Based on the lazy bank hypothesis, which posits collateral as a substitute, Jiménez, 
Salas-Fumás, and Saurina (2004) examine whether banks with a lower level of expertise in 
small business lending use collateral more intensively. Examining Spanish loan data from 1984 
to 2002, they find that loans originated by smaller banks, which are deemed to have fewer 
resources for credit evaluation, and by savings banks, which traditionally make loans mainly to 
households rather than businesses, are more likely to extend collateralized loans. The authors 
argue that their findings suggest collateral is used as a substitute for the evaluation of credit risk, 
and hence is compatible with the lazy bank hypothesis. 
Relationship between the borrower and the lender 
A vast amount of empirical work has investigated how the relationship between a borrower and 
a lender may affect the terms of small business lending, such as interest rates, maturity, and 
collateral requirements. The proxy variables for “relationship” vary in the literature, such as the 
duration of the lender-borrower relationship, the number of financial products the borrower 
purchases from the lender (“scope” of relationship), and the number of banks with which the 
borrower has transactions. 
As with the theoretical literature, the empirical results in the above studies are contradictory. 
Berger and Udell (1995), Brick, Kane, and Palia (2004), Harhoff and Körting (1998), and 
Jiménez, Salas-Fumás, and Saurina (2004) find negative relationships between the duration of 
                                                      
5  Elsas and Krahnen (2000) argue that their empirical results neither support the role of collateral as a 
signaling device in the presence of adverse selection nor as an incentive device in the presence of moral 
hazard.   8
the bank-firm relationship and the probability that collateral will be pledged. These findings are 
consistent with the model of relationship banking and reputation posited by Boot and Thakor 
(1994). Berger and Udell (1995) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) also find the interest rate on 
loans falls with the duration of relationship. But Brick, Kane, and Palia (2004) argue that this 
result may be due to the endogeneity problem among loan contract terms; they find that 
endogenizing collateral and fees eliminates any significant correlation between the interest rate 
and the duration of the relationship. 
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) also find a negative relationship between the interest rate and 
the duration of the relationship, but their paper argues this result depends on the proxies used for 
the relationship: They obtain a positive relationship between the scope of lender-borrower 
relations and the collateral requirement, implying that a relationship lender will require more 
collateral than a transaction-based lender, presumably because of the hold-up problem. 
As for the empirical literature that analyzes the number of banks involved in transactions, 
Harhoff and Körting (1998) find the incidence of collateralization of credit lines increases as the 
number of financial institutions the firm is borrowing from rises. They argue that concentrated 
borrowing represents a strong lender-borrower relationship, and that their results provide 
evidence for the claim that such a relationship eases loan conditions for the borrower. On the 
other hand, Jiménez, Salas-Fumás, and Saurina (2004) find that the use of collateral decreases 
with the number of financial institutions used by the borrower. Interestingly, they interpret the 
number of lenders as an increase in the bargaining power of the borrower, and hence reach the 
same conclusion qualitatively as Harhoff and Körting (1998). Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
provide anecdotal evidence from conversations with U.S. bankers that concentrated borrowing 
implies a “strong relationship.” 
In contrast to the literature above (except Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000)), Elsas and 
Krahnen (2000) and Pozzolo (2004) obtain results consistent with the idea that relationship 
lenders do require collateral more frequently than other lenders because of the positive role such 
collateral plays in relationship lending. Using survey data from German banks, Elsas and 
Krahnen find that “housebanks,” defined as relationship-lenders, have a higher probability of 
holding loans backed by collateral and personal guarantees than other banks. Pozzolo (2004) 
finds a positive relationship between the term of the loan and the probability of collateralization. 
He finds, however, a negative relationship between loan term and the probability of the loan 
being secured by personal guarantees. 
3 Data 
We use data from the “Survey of Corporate Procurement” (2001), the “Survey of the Financial 
Environment” (2002), and the “Survey of the Corporate Financial Environment” (2003) 
conducted by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency of Japan (collectively referred to as 
“SFEs” hereinafter). In each of these surveys, a questionnaire was sent to a total of 15,000 
companies, mainly small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs hereinafter), of which around 
7,000 to 9,000 firms responded each year. Although the contents of the SFEs vary from year to 
year, the surveys ask a number of detailed questions regarding firm characteristics and financial 
transactions such as the number of financial institutions the firm deals with; its relationship with 
its “main bank” (an obvious candidate for the relationship-lender); whether loans are secured by 
collateral, personal guarantees, or government-sponsored credit guarantees; and interest rates 
charged on short-term loans. Because we are interested in the role of collateral and personal 
guarantees in small business lending, we restrict our sample to SMEs, that is, enterprises with   9
capital of no more than 300 million yen or no more than 300 regular employees. Unless 
otherwise stated, we use the 2002 SFE, which provides the most detailed information on the use 
of collateral and personal guarantees. We also use the TSR (Tokyo Shoko Research) database, 
which consists of financial statements of SMEs, and we match the data obtained from the TSR 
with that from the SFE. The TSR database also provides credit scores for the firms, and we use 
this variable as a proxy for the borrower’s credit risk. The score ranges from 0 to 100 points, 
with a higher credit score implying a lower credit risk for the firm. The score consists of four 
components: (i) management ability such as the business experience of the manager and 
outstanding assets that can be collateralized (20 points); (ii) growth potential of sales and profits 
(25 points); (iii) stability factors such as firm age, amounts of capital, past payment and credit 
history of the firm (45 points); and (iv) reputation and disclosure (10 points). Based on the total 
credit score, the firm is judged as either “requiring no caution (80-100),” “safe (65-79),” 
“requiring little caution (50-64),” “requiring some caution (30-49),” or “requiring caution (less 
than 30).” The score is subjective in the sense that each researcher of the TSR grades the firms 
for which he is responsible. It should also be noted that the absolute values of the scores may be 
of little value in some cases because researchers are asked to assign a score of 50 points to the 
“average” firms with which they are working. Despite these shortcomings, the TSR credit score 
is viewed as a typical metric of credit risk for SMEs in Japan and we use the score with care. 
Table 1 shows the median values of several variables for the 2002 SFE, depending on whether 
the firm pledges collateral, personal guarantees, or has government sponsored credit guarantees 
on its loans from the main bank. As shown in the last row, the median amount of capital for 
firms surveyed is over 2 million yen and the median number of employees is 36, which implies 
that our sample consists of relatively “large” SMEs.
6 Note also that the standard deviation of 
each variable is fairly large; thus we report the median rather than the average in the table. 
Table 1 reveals that firms which pledge collateral or personal guarantees, or roughly 
three-fourths of the sample, are typical SMEs in our sample in terms of size, credit risk, and 
several financial ratios. Firms receiving credit guarantees, which account for about half the 
sample, are relatively smaller and deemed riskier than the others. They are thus subject to higher 
interest rates. 
Composition of collateral and personal guarantees 
Tables 2 and 3 show the composition of collateral by type of assets pledged and the composition 
of guarantors, respectively, using 2001 SFE data. The figures do not add up to 100% because 
more than one response is allowed. Table 2 confirms the widely held view that Japanese SMEs 
most often pledge real estate as collateral. Financial assets such as deposits, shares, and 
commercial bills are the second most common form of collateral and are especially common 
among the low-score (high-risk) firms. Account receivables and inventories, which are typical 
assets pledged for working capital in the United States, are rarely used. The table does not 
distinguish between inside and outside collateral
7. 
Table 3 shows that the representative of the firm is the guarantor in most cases. In addition, 
directors other than the representative and relatives of the representative occasionally guarantee 
loans, especially for low-score firms. Clearly, personal guarantees serve as outside collateral. 
                                                      
6  The average number of employees for all SMEs was seven, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications, “Establishment and Enterprise Census in Japan 2001.” 
7  See footnote 1 for the definition of inside and outside collateral. Our conversations with Japanese 
bankers suggest that small business owners’ personal assets are pledged as collateral in some cases.   10
4 Empirical  Results 
4.1 Variables 
The terms of the loan contracts we analyze are whether the borrower pledges collateral and/or 
personal guarantees to its main bank, and the short-term interest rate charged by the main bank.
8 
The variable COLL and GUAR are 0/1 variables that take the value of 1 if the borrower pledges 
collateral/personal guarantees to its main bank. The variable RATE indicates the short-term 
interest rate as of end of October 2002, in tenths of a basis point (i.e., 1000 indicates 1.000%). 
We have grouped our explanatory variables into three classes: riskiness of the borrower, 
screening and monitoring by the lender, and the relationship between the borrower and the 
lender. 
The riskiness of the borrower is approximated by several variables that help capture the risk 
profile of the borrower. The variable SCORE indicates the TSR credit score explained above. 
Other than SCORE, we use a number of financial ratios such as LEV (leverage ratio, i.e., debt 
outstanding/total assets outstanding), PROFMARG (profit margins, i.e., profits before tax/gross 
sales), CASHRATIO (cash ratio, i.e., cash holdings/gross sales), and LOGSALES (the logarithm 
of sales). 
The 2002 SFE asks respondent firms how often they have contact with the loan officers of their 
main banks, whether they submit relevant documents such as financial statements and cash flow 
forecast tables to their main banks so that banks can assess borrowers’ credit risks, and if so, 
how often. Hence, screening and monitoring activities by lenders are captured by the variables 
DOC, DOCFREQ, CONTACTFREQ. The 0/1 variable DOC takes the value of 1 if the borrower 
submits documents to its main bank, and the index variable DOCFREQ shows the frequency, 
with the lowest value 1 indicating the shortest frequency (1: once every 1-2 months, 2: quarterly, 
3: semi-annually, 4: annually). Similarly, the index variable CONTACTFREQ indicates the 
frequency of loan officer contact and takes the value of 1-9 (1: every day, 2: weekly, 3: once 
every 2 weeks, 4: monthly, 5: bi-monthly, 6: quarterly, 7: semi-annually, 8: annually, 9: no 
contact). We also use the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, NPL, as an ex-post 
measure of screening and monitoring activities by the lender. We assume that the bank’s 
non-performing loan ratio is negatively correlated with the intensity of its screening and 
monitoring efforts. 
Finally, we use the following lender-borrower relationship variables: DURATION, which 
indicates the duration of the main bank-borrower relationship, SCOPE, which indicates the 
number of financial products the borrower purchases from its main bank (“scope” relationship), 
and BANKS, which indicates the number of banks with which the borrower has transactions
9. 
Similar to the definition of housebanks in Elsas and Krahnen (2000), the definition of a main 
bank in the SFE is somewhat subjective because each respondent firm is asked to choose its 
main bank based on its own perceptions. As for the number of financial products purchased, the 
2002 SFE asks firms to list all products, other than loans, which they purchase from the main 
banks. We then tabulate the number of products that each firm has purchased.
10 
                                                      
8  If the borrower has several short-term loans with its mainbank, the loan with the highest interest rate is 
reported. 
9  We also construct an index variable, BANKONE, which takes the value of 1 if the borrower has a sole 
transaction with its main bank. 
10  We exclude the items “purchasing additional stock of the mainbank” and “hiring retired bankers,”   11
Table 4 lists the variables used in our empirical analysis and their definitions. Several 
unexplained variables will be discussed below. 
4.2  Preliminary findings on the role of collateral and personal guarantees 
Before explaining our regression models and results, it is useful to provide a preliminary 
overview of how the riskiness of the borrower, the degree of screening and monitoring by the 
lenders, and the relationship between the two affects the share of borrowers who use collateral 
and personal guarantees.   
Riskiness of the borrower 
As stated above, we use the TSR credit score as a measure for ex-ante risk of the borrower. 
Table 5 shows the percentage of borrowers using collateral, the percentage of those using 
personal guarantees, and the average short-term interest rates (RATE) paid by 
collateral/guarantee-user and non-users, by credit score category (SCORE). Table 5 indicates a 
negative relationship between credit score and use of collateral and personal guarantees, and 
thus favors moral hazard hypothesis. Interestingly, even within the same credit score category, 
borrowers who pledge collateral and personal guarantees are charged higher interest rates than 
those who do not. This is consistent with the finding in Berger and Udell (1990), who argue 
riskier borrowers more often pledge collateral, but that recourse to collateral less than fully 
offsets the difference in borrower risk. The interest rate differential between the two is 
especially large for low-score (high-risk) borrowers. 
We also investigate whether there are any preliminary findings consistent with the adverse 
selection hypothesis. First, following the model of Jiménez, Salas-Fumás, and Saurina (2004), 
we look into the amount of collateral pledged. The 2002 SFE provides a value index of 
collateral, which measures the present value of collateral relative to the amount of debt incurred. 
Table 6 shows that, once the decision has been made to pledge collateral, it is the high-score 
(low risk) borrowers who pledge more, suggesting the plausibility of the adverse selection 
model. However, we attribute this finding to the simple fact that the low-score borrowers often 
do not have enough assets to fully secure the loan. The bottom row of Table 6 shows the ratio of 
borrowers who own real estate whose value exceeds the amount of short-term and long-term 
loans.
11  Naturally, the percentage rises along with the score of the borrowers. 
Second, we examine the relationship between the share of borrowers using collateral and 
personal guarantees in year 2001 and the TSR credit score in 2002 (Table 7). Because the credit 
score in 2002 is unobservable by the lender in 2001, we think this is a more appropriate way to 
test whether the lender uses collateral and personal guarantees to deal with the problem of 
adverse selection, under which the borrower’s riskiness is unknown. Table 7 indicates, however, 
that the relationship between the share of borrowers using collateral and personal guarantees 
and the credit score a year after the loan is made is still negative, which is inconsistent with the 
adverse selection hypothesis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
which appear irrelevant to building the relationship. 
11  We use the value of real estate because this is the most common asset pledged as collateral in Japan 
(Table 2). We have also compared the results against the value of other assets that can be collateralized, 
such as securities, and cash. The result is effectively the same.   12
Screening and monitoring by the lender 
One important new approach in this paper is our use of direct measures for screening and 
monitoring activities by lenders in our examination of the relationship between use of collateral 
and personal guarantees and screening and monitoring. Because it is somewhat subjective to 
posit a priori which type of lenders have a relative advantage in evaluating and managing credit 
risks of small business borrowers (as was done by Jiménez, Salas-Fumás, and Saurina, 2004), 
our work may shed light on how collateral may affect the screening and monitoring incentives 
of the lender. 
Table 8 shows the relationship between the frequency of document submission (DOCFREQ) 
and the use of collateral and personal guarantees, and average short-term interest rates
12. 
Because the use of collateral and personal guarantees and the average short-term interest rate are 
affected by borrower risk, we make observations by credit-score category (the rows in Table 8). 
In general, the higher the percentage of loans with either collateral or personal guarantees, the 
more often borrowers submit documents. This preliminary result is inconsistent with the lazy 
bank hypothesis, which claims that a bank requires collateral as a substitute for screening and 
monitoring. Interest rates are somewhat higher for borrowers who submit documents more 
frequently.  
We make a similar tabulation to investigate whether banks that contact their borrowers more 
often (CONTACTFREQ) are more likely to have loans with collateral and personal guarantees 
(table not reported), and obtain qualitatively the same result as above. We also examine the 
relationship between the non-performing loan ratio (NPL) and use of collateral and personal 
guarantees, because NPL may serve as an ex-post measure for screening and monitoring 
activities by the lender. We have found, however, no monotonic relationship between the two 
(table not reported). 
Relationship between the borrower and the lender 
Table 10 shows the relationship between the duration of the main bank-borrower relationship 
(DURATION)
13 and the use of collateral and personal guarantees, and the average short-term 
interest rate. As the duration increases, the share of collateralized and personally guaranteed 
loans rises. Note also that the collateral ratio is relatively low for borrowers with main bank 
relationships of less than 15 years, regardless of credit score. This suggests collateral and 
personal guarantees are complementary to the relationship, and is consistent with both the 
“hold-up” argument (the “dark side” of the relationship) and the “mitigation of the soft-budget 
constraint” argument (the “bright side” of relationship). Interest rates are somewhat lower for 
borrowers with longer main bank relationships, but the correlation is less clear-cut. The finding 
on interest rates is thus inconsistent with the hold-up hypothesis. 
Tables 11 and 12 make similar observations for the number of financial products purchased by 
the borrower from its main bank (SCOPE) and the number of banks the borrower has 
                                                      
12  We have also investigated the frequency of document submission (DOCFREQ) by each banking sector 
and checked whether a particular banking sector monitors the borrowers more frequently (Table 9). Table 
9 shows that the monitoring frequency of Shinkin (credit unions) and Shinkumi (credit cooperatives) are 
slightly shorter than the other banking sectors, because their shares of low-score borrowers that require 
intensive monitoring are larger than those of the other sectors. Hence, controlling for the effect of 
borrower risk, we do not find any relationship between the banking sector and monitoring frequency. This 
reinforces our empirical strategy of not positing a priori which type of lenders have a relative advantage 
in evaluating and managing credit risks of small business borrowers. 
13  Each respondent firm is asked to state the exact number of years it has been dealing with its mainbank.   13
transactions with (BANKS). Table 11 leads us qualitatively to the same results as above: 
Borrowers with more “scope” in the relationship are more likely to pledge collateral and 
personal guarantees, and make slightly lower interest payments (although the relationship is less 
clear). 
Table 12 gives a somewhat different view of the lender-borrower relationship. It shows that 
borrowers who establish proprietary (sole) relationships with their main banks pledge collateral 
and personal guarantees less often than those who do not. In the case of collateral, which is 
more likely to be inside than personal guarantees, this preliminary evidence supports the idea 
that the main reason for requiring borrowers to pledge collateral is to secure seniority for the 
main bank’s claims, because the need to define seniority among creditors would be less in the 
case of a single transaction. 
4.3  Regression model and results 
We estimate the following equation to verify whether collateral and personal guarantee 
requirements are greater for riskier borrowers, for banks with more intensive monitoring 
activities, and for borrowers with more intimate banking relationships: 
) , , , , , , ( ) Pr( OTHERS CONTRACTS LENDER FIRM RELATION MONITORING RISK f g Y ij i j ij i j ij = =  
where  Yij equals 1 if the loan made by bank i to the borrowing firm j is collateralized or 
personally guaranteed. RISKj is a vector of variables specifying the risk profile of the borrower. 
MONITORINGi is a vector of variables of monitoring activities by banks. RELATIONij is a 
vector of variables indicating the bank-firm relationship. All of these variables are discussed in 
Table 4. FIRMj and LENDERi are dummy variables for firm and lender characteristics, where 
FIRMj indicates the industry the firm belongs to and LENDERi indicates the sector (such as city 
bank or regional bank) that the bank belongs to. Finally, we control for the contracting terms 
(CONTRACTSij) such as interest rate, RATEij, and whether the borrower pledges a guarantee or 
collateral to its main bank. These variables are potentially endogenous, and we discuss how we 
deal with the problem of endogenous regressors below. The variables in OTHERS include 
several variables that are specifically important determinants for collateral and personal 
guarantees. For example, the variable MATURITYj which represents the ratio of short-term loans 
to long-term loans is likely to be correlated with whether the loan is collateralized because 
long-term loans such as equipment lending and real estate lending are more likely to be secured 
by physical assets to be held by the borrower. The equation above is estimated using probit 
specification for both collateral and personal guarantees. 
  As in Berger and Udell (1990), we also estimate the following interest rate equation as an 
indirect test for the determinants of collateral and personal guarantees.   
) , , , , , , ( OTHERS Y LENDER FIRM RELATION MONITORING RISK f RATE ij i j ij i j ij =  
In particular, if a borrower who establishes a solid relationship with its main bank is more likely 
to pledge collateral and personal guarantees, the interest rate equation verifies whether the 
complementarity between collateral and personal guarantees and the bank-firm relationship is 
due to the hold-up problem or to mitigation of the soft-budget constraint.   14
Estimation strategies 
We begin with the probit estimations for collateral and personal guarantees, and the OLS 
estimation for the interest rate, assuming that the contract-terms are exogenous explanatory 
variables. For example, regarding the probit estimation for collateral, the interest rates and the 
binary variable for personal guarantees are assumed to be exogenous. 
We then implement the probit estimations for collateral and personal guarantees, treating 
interest rates as an endogenous variable. The estimation will follow the maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure with the endogenous variable in Wooldridge (2004, pp.475-476). The idea 
is to obtain the parameters of the model and their standard errors by maximizing the likelihood 
function of the following equation: 
) | ( ) , | ( ) | , ( z z z RATE f RATE Y f RATE Y f ij ij =  
where  z  is a vector of instrumental variables. As shown in the second term of the right-hand 
side equation, interest rates (endogenous variable) are estimated by the instrumental variable. 
The instrumental variables of interest rates are measures of market power and the age of the 
borrowing firm (FIRMAGE). We use the Herfindahl Index for small business lending in the 
prefecture of the firm, denoted as HHI, as our market power measure. Because HHI is computed 
based on the share of small business lending of regional banks, second-tier regional banks, 
Shinkin  (credit unions), and Shinkumi  (credit cooperatives), we also include the aggregated 
share of city banks in small business lending in the prefecture of the firm (CITYSHARE). These 
market power variables are taken from the Kinyu Journal, “Regional Finance Map.” The 
information obtained from the interest rates equation as well as information from the collateral 
(personal guarantees) equation is simultaneously used in estimating the parameters. 
It may be preferable to endogenize personal guarantees (collateral) as well as interest rates in 
estimating the probability of collateral (personal guarantees) pledged. However, the number of 
endogenous variables that we can handle in the full maximum likelihood procedure is 
constrained by the computational difficulties in getting the iterations to converge. Alternatively, 
we follow the two-stage conditional maximum likelihood method (Wooldridge, 2004, 
pp.472-475), in which the interest rates and personal guarantees (collateral) are estimated by 
ordinary least squares with instrumental variables in the first step, and then the probit model for 
collateral (personal guarantees) is estimated in the second step, using the fitted values and the 
standard errors obtained in the first-step estimations. The instrumental variable used in the 
first-step estimation for personal guarantees is the share of equity holdings held by the owner 
and his relatives in the previous year, 2001: the index variables OWNERRATIO take the value 
of 1-7, with the highest value 7 indicating the 100% equity holdings (1: 0%, 2: 1-5%, 3: 6-25%, 
4: 26-50%, 5: 51-74%, 6: 75-99%, 7: 100%). The instrumental variable for collateral is the ratio 
of real estate holdings to total assets (LANDRATIO). 
Based on these three types of estimations, we will make our inference on how the riskiness of 
the borrower, the degree of screening and monitoring by the lenders, and the relationship 
between the two affects the share of borrowers who use collateral and personal guarantees. 
Estimation results 
Tables 13, 14, and 15 report our estimation results for collateral, personal guarantees, and 
interest rates equations, respectively. The first column of each table provides the estimates of 
the benchmark models in which all the terms of loan contracts are assumed to be exogenous.   15
The second column shows the estimates of the full maximum likelihood models with one 
endogenous variable (interest rates), and the third column shows the estimates of the two-step 
maximum likelihood models with two endogenous variables. Coefficients for firm and lender 
characteristics dummy variables are omitted from the tables. 
We first investigate the COLLATERAL equation (Table 13). In the basic probit estimation for 
collateral, GUAR and RATE are positively correlated with the probability of collateral being 
pledged. The SCORE receives an insignificant negative coefficient, but the coefficient of LEV is 
positive and significant, suggesting that collateral is used to suppress the debtor’s moral hazard. 
The negative and significant coefficient of DOCFREQ indicates the complementarity between 
monitoring by the lender and collateral requirements. The positive coefficients of the 
relationship variables (DURATION, SCOPE) show that collateral is also complementary to the 
relationship. 
In the second column of Table 13, the full maximum likelihood estimation with interest rates 
treated as endogenous exhibits similar results. In order to achieve the convergence, we dropped 
several explanatory variables that are less relevant
14. A Wald statistics test of exogeneity rejects 
the null hypothesis of the interest rate being exogenous. Once we control for the endogeneity of 
the interest rate, its coefficient becomes significantly negative. This indicates that borrowers 
who pledge collateral to their main bank are charged lower interest rates, presumably because 
collateral ensures the seniority of main bank’s claims and limits debtor moral hazard. Compared 
with the basic probit estimation, two variables are worth noting. SCORE has a significantly 
negative sign, thus strengthening the robustness of the moral hazard hypothesis. The sign of 
SCOPE becomes negative, although it is insignificant. Nevertheless, the coefficient of 
DURATION is still positive and significant, suggesting the complementarity between collateral 
and the bank-borrower relationship. 
The third column of Table 13 presents the estimation results for the two-step procedure in which 
personal guarantees as well as interest rates are endogenous. Although we lose efficiency in the 
coefficients for most variables to a certain degree, the results obtained in the previous 
estimations remain valid qualitatively. 
In parallel fashion, Table 14 provides the estimation results for personal guarantees. The second 
and third columns of Table 14 show estimates for full and two-step maximum likelihood 
procedures, respectively, but the Wald statistics test of exogeneity cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of interest rate and collateral being exogenous. Hence, we will make our inference 
based on the basic probit estimation results (first column, Table 14). Somewhat surprisingly, 
many credit risk variables correlated with the probability of collateral being pledged are 
insignificant in the GUARANTEE equation. SCORE and LEV are insignificant, while 
LOGSALES has a significant and negative sign, indicating firms with larger sales are less likely 
to pledge personal guarantees. These results, however, are likely to be due to multicollinearity 
among  SCORE, the terms of loan contracts, and other financial ratios. Once we drop the 
loan-contract and other financial ratio variables, SCORE has a significantly negative sign, 
suggesting that personal guarantees are also used to contain the debtors’ moral hazard. 
The complementarity of personal guarantees to monitoring and the borrower-lender relationship 
becomes weaker but is maintained in the GUARANTEE equation. The coefficient of the 
frequency of document submission (DOCFREQ) is significantly negative, which implies that 
personal guarantees are complementary to monitoring by lenders. SCOPE is 
significantlypositive, also suggesting the complementarity of personal guarantees and the 
                                                      
14  Firm and lender characteristics dummy variables are also excluded in this estimation.   16
borrower-lender relationship. An exception is the negative and significant coefficient of 
ONEBANK. 
Finally, Table 15 shows estimation results for the interest rate. The second and third columns 
are “first-step” estimation results in COLLATERAL equations. The negative and significant 
coefficient of SCORE indicates that the borrowers’ risk is negatively correlated with the interest 
rates charged by the main bank. The negative coefficient of SCOPE and the positive coefficient 
of BANKS are inconsistent with the hold-up hypothesis. 
As a robustness check, we divide our sample into credit guarantee users and non-users and 
re-estimated for the latter firms for the following reason: The Japanese government has credit 
guarantee programs designed to mitigate the financial difficulties faced by SMEs, and more than 
half of our sample firms use such credit guarantees. In the event a borrower cannot repay its 
debt to the bank, the credit guarantee corporation covers the debt, whereupon it receives a claim 
against the borrowing firm. In principle, the credit guarantee corporation guarantees 100% of 
the loans outstanding, meaning the bank bears no credit risk. As shown in Table 17, the share of 
borrowers who use credit guarantees is inversely related to the credit score and the share of 
borrowers who pledge collateral is very high among credit guarantee users, irrespective of the 
credit score.
15 Thus, the use of credit guarantees may have influenced our inference above. 
Estimation for the non-guarantee users excludes such distortions, which is shown in Table 16. 
We posit the probit and OLS estimation results for collateral, personal guarantees, and the 
interest rates. Most of the significant coefficients in Tables 13, 14, and 15 are qualitatively 
unchanged in the table, while a few of them lose their significance, possibly due to the smaller 
number of observations. 
5 Concluding  Remarks 
This paper investigates the role of collateral and personal guarantees in small business lending 
using the unique data set of Japan’s small business loan market. Consistent with conventional 
theory, collateral is more likely to be pledged by riskier borrowers, implying such collateral 
may be useful in mitigating debtor moral hazard. Contrary to conventional theory, we find that 
banks whose claims are either collateralized or personally guaranteed monitor borrowers more 
frequently. We also find that borrowers who establish long-term relationships with their main 
banks are more likely to pledge collateral. Our empirical evidence thus suggests that collateral 
and personal guarantees are complementary to relationship lending. 
Our findings have the following implications for the current debate on strengthening  the 
function of relationship banking in Japan. In the bubble economy period, real estate was 
considered such a safe collateral asset that the incentive of financial institutions to monitor the 
borrowers was undermined insofar as loans were collateralized. This phenomenon may be 
behind the widely held view that accepting collateral hinders the banks’ monitoring effort and 
thus undermines relationship lending in Japan. However, our evidence suggests this may no 
longer hold true. Based on data from the early 2000s, we find that lenders who require 
borrowers to pledge collateral and personal guarantees are more likely to monitor intensively. 
Therefore, emphasizing only the negative side of collateral and recommending non-collateral 
loans, such as the rapidly expanding credit scoring loans, may in fact hinder screening and 
                                                      
15  The maximum loan amount for the most common credit guarantee program is 200 million yen and 
collateral can be required for loans of more than 80 million yen. This collateral requirement is deemed to 
prevent moral hazard. Thus, users of credit guarantee programs may pledge collateral for institutional 
requirements rather than for the economic reasons we have discussed.   17
monitoring activities by lenders that are inherent in relationship lending. We also find that 
collateral is more likely to be pledged by borrowers who establish long-term relationships with 
their main bank. This evidence reinforces our argument. 
There are a few caveats and further issues to be addressed. First, the sample firms in our 
analysis are rather large, which may bias our empirical results. In Japan, small businesses with 
no more than 20 employees make up more than 70% of all firms, while the median firm in our 
sample has 36 workers. Hence, it may be the case that only fairly sizable, well-established 
SMEs with sufficient collateral benefit from relationship lending, while their smaller 
counterparts that are short of collateral face strict borrowing constraints. Second, our estimation 
may have been biased due to inaccurate assessments of firms’ credit risk. We employ the TSR 
credit scores and balance sheet items to measure the credit risk of a firm. However, if there is 
private information to which only banks have access, our empirical results may be biased due to 
the problem of measurement error. We may be able to better approximate the actual credit risk 
of firms by employing future credit scores or the firms’ default measures; we need to examine 
this point more closely. Finally, we find evidence that weakly rejects the hold-up hypothesis: 
Interest rates are relatively lower for borrowers who establish a solid relationship with their 
main banks. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate whether collateral 
mitigates the soft-budget constraint problem in relationship lending. In order to evaluate the 
efficiencies of Japan’s credit market, it is important to further investigate the motivations of 
banks in accepting collateral and personal guarantees. In order to make a welfare judgment, it is 
also necessary to evaluate whether the enhanced bargaining power of the lender, be it due to 
hold-up of the borrower or mitigation of the soft budget constraint, facilitates the screening and 
monitoring activities of the lender and thereby increases the availability of credits for small 
businesses. This issue should be addressed in more detail in future studies. 
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With Collateral  4,834  (73.9) 197,509 38  1,299,848 55  2000  0.0139  0.2009
With Personal Guarantee  4,984  (76.2) 161,017 32  1,079,825 55  2100  0.0133  0.1991
With Credit Guarantee  3,381  (51.7) 96,277  26  873,705  53  2375  0.0120  0.1588
With Collateral and Personal Guarantee 
And With Credit Guarantee  2,819  (43.1) 104,015 28  931,178  53  2400  0.0122  0.1537
And Without Credit Guarantee  1,413  (21.6) 417,121 52  1,939,796 59  1750  0.0160  0.2966
Without Collateral, Personal 
Guarantee, or Credit Guarantee 
889 (13.6) 464,040 45  2,098,614 60  1375  0.0182 0.3860
All Samples  6,540  (100.0) 207,012 36  1,290,303 56  2000  0.0143  0.2201
（standard deviation）     (1,797,737) (155)  (5,837,277) (7)  (1204)  (0.2506)  (0.3028)
Note: As of 2002 hereinafter, unless otherwise stated.   21
Table 2    Composition of Collateral 
  TSR Credit Scores 
 
Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
No. of Samples  5,920  850  1,394  1,484  1,032  914  246 
(share, %)  (100.0)  (14.4)  (23.5) (25.1) (17.4) (15.4)  (4.2) 
Percentage of Borrowers with Collateral  77.4  84.5  82.0  80.2  74.8  68.8  54.1 
Composition of Collateral (multiple answers allowed, %) 
  real  estate  95.9 95.8 96.0 95.5 95.9 96.8 95.5 
  machinery  5.4 6.3 4.6 5.0 5.8 4.8  10.5 
  deposits  22.8 29.2 28.4 24.4 16.5 12.2 12.0 
 equity  securities  9.2  11.4  10.9  9.2  7.0  7.0  6.0 
  commercial  bills  6.9 8.4 8.1 7.1 5.2 5.4 2.3 
  other  securities  2.4 3.6 3.4 2.2 1.2 1.4 0.8 
  proceeds of guarantee  1.2  2.6  1.1  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.8 
  accounts  receivable  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.9 1.3 0.8 
  intellectual  property  0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  others  1.9 1.4 2.1 1.5 2.6 1.3 3.8 
Note: As of 2001. 
Table 3    Composition of Personal Guarantees 
  TSR Credit Scores 
 
Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
No. of Samples  5,920  850  1,394  1,484  1,032  914  246 
(share, %)  (100.0)  (14.4)  (23.5) (25.1) (17.4) (15.4)  (4.2) 
Percentages of Borrowers with Personal 
Guarantee 
72.6 82.7 81.0 76.1 67.5 58.8 40.7 
Composition of Personal Guarantee (multiple answers allowed, %) 
  Representative  94.8 95.3 94.5 94.6 95.1 94.4 95.0 
  Executives other than representative  34.1  45.9  38.2  34.1  25.5  23.5  21.0 
  Relatives  of  representative  18.3 30.0 20.5 17.0 14.6  8.0  8.0 
  Third  party  (individuals)  2.4 6.4 2.5 2.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 
  Enterprises with capital relationship  6.3  7.4  6.9  5.9  5.9  5.0  4.0 
  Enterprises without capital relationship  0.6  1.3  0.5  0.7  0.0  0.2  0.0 
  Other  1.1 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.4 0.7 0.0 
Note: As of 2001.   22
Table  4  Variable  Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Terms of loan contracts 
  COLL  1 if the borrower pledges collateral to its main bank, 0 otherwise 
  GUAR  1 if the borrower pledges a personal guarantee to its main bank, 0 otherwise 
  RATE  short-term interest charged by the main bank. If the borrower has several short-term loans with its main 
bank, the loan with the highest rate is reported 
  GOVGUAR  1 if the borrower uses government sponsored credit guarantees for the loans provided by its main bank, 0 
otherwise 
Riskiness of borrower 
  SCORE  TSR Credit Score (0-100) 
  LEV  ratio of total debts outstanding to total assets 
  PROFMARG  ratio of profits before tax to gross sales 
  CASHRATIO  ratio of cash holdings to total assets 
  LOGSALES  gross sales in logarithm 
Screening and monitoring by lender 
  DOC  1 if the borrower submits relevant documents, such as financial statements, to its main bank, 0 otherwise 
  DOCFREQ  index variable indicating the frequency of document submission to the borrower's main bank: 
1: once every 1-2 months, 2: quarterly, 3: semi-annually, 4: annually 
  CONTACTFREQ  index variable indicating the main bank's frequency of contact with the borrower: 
1: every day, 2: weekly, 3: once every 2 weeks, 4: monthly, 5: bi-monthly, 6: quarterly, 7: semi-annually, 
8: annually, 9: no contact 
  NPL  ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
Relationship between borrower and lender 
  DURATION  duration of the main bank-borrower relationship in years 
  SCOPE  number of financial products the borrower purchases from its main bank 
  BANKS  number of banks the borrower has transactions with 
  ONEBANK  1 if the borrower has a single bank to make transaction with 
Other variables 
  MATURITY  ratio of short-term to long-term loans, where short-term loans are defined as loans with maturity less than 
one year 
  FIRM  borrower dummy variable classified by industry 
  LENDER  lender dummy variable classified by type of banking sector 
Instrumental variables 
  LANDRATIO  ratio of real estate holdings to total assets 
  OWNERRATIO  index variable for the owner and his relatives' share of equity holdings: 
1: 0%, 2: 1-5%, 3: 6-25%, 4: 26-50%, 5: 51-74%, 6: 75-99%, 7: 100% 
  FIRMAGE  age of the borrowing firm 
  HHI  Herfindahl Index for small business lending in the prefecture of the firm. Herfindahl Index is computed based 
on the share of small business lending of regional banks, second-tier regional banks, shinkin, and shinkumi.
  CITYSHARE  city banks' share of small business lending in the prefecture of the firm 
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Table 5    Use Rate of Collateral, Personal Guarantees and Average Interest Rates 
  TSR Credit Scores 
 
Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
No. of Samples  5,380  868  1,521  1,366  850  663  112 
(share, %)  (100.0)  (16.1)  (28.3) (25.4) (15.8) (12.3)  (2.1) 
Collateral         
 
Percentage of Borrowers 
 with Collateral 
79.7 85.1 82.0 80.7 76.5 71.5 69.6 
 
Average Interest Rate 
 (with Collateral, 0.1 b.p.) 
2283 3073 2557 2069 1800 1636 1386 
 
Average Interest Rate 
 (without Collateral, 0.1f b.p.) 
1842 2653 2224 1767 1552 1269 1157 
Personal  Guarantees         
 
Percentage of Borrowers 
 with Personal Guarantees 
81.8 90.6 87.2 83.7 73.6 67.1 64.3 
 
Average Interest Rate 
 (with Personal Guarantees, 
 0.1 b.p.) 
2326 3080 2581 2088 1867 1648 1341 
 
Average Interest Rate 
 (without Personal Guarantees, 
 0.1 b.p.) 
1600 2347 1919 1614 1392 1294 1272 
Note: Sample in the table is restricted to borrowers who reported short-term interest rates. 
Table 6    Value of Collateral and Real Estate Holdings 
  TSR Credit Scores 
 
Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
No. of Samples  5,380  868  1,521  1,366  850  663  112 
(share, %)  (100.0)  (16.1)  (28.3) (25.4) (15.8) (12.3)  (2.1) 
Percentage of Borrowers with Collateral  79.7  85.1  82.0  80.7  76.5  71.5  69.6 
Distribution of Borrowers (%): 
 
Value of Collateral 
 << Loans Outstanding 
23.0 31.1 24.8 19.1 20.9 18.8 17.9 
 
Value of Collateral 
 < Loans Outstanding 
24.1 25.3 26.3 24.4 24.0 17.3 15.4 
 
Value of Collateral 
 = Loans Outstanding 
24.7 21.0 25.4 27.7 22.3 25.3 23.1 
 
Value of Collateral 
 > Loans Outstanding 
11.8 10.3 11.1 12.6 13.2 12.0 11.5 
 
Value of Collateral 
 >> Loans Outstanding 
14.4 10.3 10.7 14.2 17.2 24.9 29.5 
Percentages of borrowers whose 
 amount of real estate holdings exceed 
 loans outstanding 
9.0 1.8 4.1 8.6  13.7  23.0  35.9 
Note: Sample in the table is restricted to borrowers who reported short-term interest rates.   24
Table 7    Use Rate of Collateral and Personal Guarantees in 2001: By 2002 Credit Scores 
  TSR Credit Scores in 2002 
 
Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
Percentage of Borrowers 
 with Collateral in 2001  76.0  82.6  80.5  77.9  72.7  66.9  50.5 
(in 2002)  (73.9)  (80.4)  (78.4)  (75.1) (69.0) (64.8) (56.0) 
Percentage of Borrowers 
 with Personal Guarantee in 2001  74.8 85.8 81.5 78.4 68.3 58.9 46.7 
(in 2002)  (76.2)  (87.0)  (83.9)  (78.3) (67.1) (60.4) (51.6) 
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Table 8    Use Rate of Collateral, Personal Guarantees and Average Interest Rates: 
By Frequency of Document Submission   
TSR Credit Scores 
Frequency of Document Submission   Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
Percentage of Borrowers with Collateral 
  once every 1-2 months  91.5  92.3  94.8  88.9  89.9  78.1  93.8 
  quarterly  87.6 88.1 88.6 89.3 83.5 83.6 75.0 
  semi-annually  75.9 78.8 77.7 77.2 73.7 70.9 72.4 
  annually  67.2 69.3 69.5 70.1 66.0 63.8 53.3 
Percentage of Borrowers with Personal Guarantee 
  once every 1-2 months  89.7  92.3  91.4  91.4  85.8  71.2  68.8 
  quarterly  88.4 91.1 93.6 91.9 77.6 69.1 50.0 
  semi-annually  70.9 82.7 80.4 73.8 59.2 56.3 62.1 
  annually  75.7 88.0 82.9 78.2 72.0 65.4 55.1 
Average Interest Rate, 0.1 b.p. 
  once every 1-2 months  2634  3192  2783  2328  1879  1588  1680 
  quarterly  2386 3015 2555 2147 1903 1927 1023 
  semi-annually  1987 2870 2310 1887 1598 1508 1486 
  annually  1985 2758 2392 1909 1759 1508 1160 
Table 9 Composition of the Frequency of Submitting Documents by Banking Sector 
TSR Credit Scores 
 Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
City Banks, Long Term Credit Banks, and Trust Banks 
No.  of  Samples  1695  170 424 472 343 240  46 
(share, %)  (100.0)  (10.0)  (25.0) (27.8) (20.2) (14.2)  (2.7) 
Composition of the Frequency of Submitting Documents (%) 
  once in 1-2 months  20.8  34.7  28.1  18.0  16.3  12.1  10.9 
 quarterly  13.4  20.6  14.2  16.7  11.4  4.6  6.5 
  semi-annually  30.9 21.2 29.5 32.4 36.4 32.9 13.0 
  annually  34.9 23.5 28.3 32.8 35.9 50.4 69.6 
Regional Banks and Second Regional Banks 
No.  of  Samples  3252  497 858 792 536 462 107 
(share, %)  (100.0)  (15.3)  (26.4) (24.4) (16.5) (14.2)  (3.3) 
Composition of the Frequency of Submitting Documents (%) 
  once in 1-2 months  23.2  44.9  30.7  17.9  13.8  9.1  10.3 
 quarterly  10.9  13.5  14.5  10.6  7.3  7.8  4.7 
  semi-annually  22.4 16.7 21.1 25.4 25.7 22.7 19.6 
  annually  43.5 24.9 33.8 46.1 53.2 60.4 65.4 
Shinkin (credit unions) and Shinkumi (credit cooperatives) 
No. of Samples  706  200  256  150  62  36  2 
(share,  %)  (100.0)  (28.3) (36.3) (21.2)  (8.8)  (5.1)  (0.3) 
Composition of the Frequency of Submitting Documents (%) 
  once in 1-2 months  28.2  44.0  25.8  24.7  12.9  19.4  50.0 
 quarterly  13.3  11.0  16.0  13.3  6.5  19.4  50.0 
 semi-annually  17.8  11.5  19.1  22.0  21.0  61.1  0.0 
  annually  40.7 33.5 39.1 40.0 59.7  0.0  0.0 
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Table 10    Use Rate of Collateral, Personal Guarantees and Average Interest Rates: 
  By Duration of Main Bank Relationship 
TSR Credit Scores  Duration of relationship 
with the main bank 
Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
Percentage of Borrowers with Collateral 
  less than 15 years  54.9  53.9  58.3  54.9  54.5  44.4  52.4 
  15-28  years  73.9 84.1 80.5 73.2 65.2 59.0 49.8 
  28-40  years  79.8 92.4 87.0 81.2 70.1 68.0 52.2 
  40 years or more  82.8  92.7  89.2  86.2  80.1  72.2  57.5 
Percentage of Borrowers with Personal Guarantees 
  less than 15 years  71.2  76.8  78.8  71.8  60.4  45.5  42.9 
  15-28  years  78.0 91.7 85.1 79.7 67.4 56.5 50.0 
  28-40  years  78.2 92.0 88.8 79.3 67.1 61.5 50.0 
  40 years or more  78.1  90.0  83.9  82.8  71.1  68.9  56.3 
Average Interest Rate, 0.1 b.p. 
  less  than  15  years  2375 2987 2556 2047 1970 1769 1382 
  15-28  years  2351 3118 2622 2112 1828 1636 1568 
  28-40  years  2193 3079 2499 2050 1702 1530 1254 
  40  years  or  more  1963 2857 2319 1870 1628 1410 1286 
Table 11    Use Rate of Collateral, Personal Guarantees and Average Interest Rates: 
By Number of Financial Products Purchased from Main Bank 
TSR Credit Scores  # of financial products 
purchased from main bank 
Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
Percentage of Borrowers with Collateral 
  0-1  48.6 54.2 55.7 43.0 41.8 42.9 26.3 
  2-3  67.1 78.6 72.5 65.5 59.7 53.3 47.7 
  4  76.0 84.6 78.4 79.9 69.1 66.4 64.4 
  5 or more  84.9  92.9  90.4  85.6  81.6  76.6  62.7 
Percentage of Borrowers with Personal Guarantees 
  0-1  58.2 72.5 68.6 53.9 39.6 38.6 31.6 
  2-3  71.1 85.1 82.0 71.4 56.9 48.6 40.9 
  4  79.5 91.9 84.5 81.8 72.0 64.6 68.9 
  5 or more  82.6  92.5  89.0  86.6  76.8  70.3  52.0 
Average Interest Rate, 0.1 b.p. 
  0-1  2299 2799 2448 2132 1797 1789 1320 
  2-3  2320 3173 2527 2075 1820 1523 1401 
  4  2226 3040 2636 2029 1773 1528 1310 
  5  or  more  2060 2896 2385 1962 1663 1505 1284 
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Table 12    Use Rate of Collateral, Personal Guarantees and Average Interest Rates: 
By Number of Banks in Transactions 
TSR Credit Scores 
# of banks in transactions  Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
Percentage of Borrowers with Collateral 
  1  52.0 67.1 56.9 52.9 43.7 42.9 29.2 
  2  73.6 79.7 71.9 69.4 74.7 73.9 84.6 
  3-4  79.7 82.7 83.9 81.2 76.4 71.8 63.8 
  5 or more  82.5  88.2  88.1  84.7  79.4  69.3  58.8 
Percentage of Borrowers with Personal Guarantee 
  1  59.4 78.7 67.9 58.5 50.0 47.5 22.9 
  2  81.7 89.6 86.1 81.3 78.3 66.7 65.4 
  3-4  81.5 91.0 86.9 84.7 71.2 68.0 65.5 
  5 or more  79.2  87.5  88.8  82.2  70.6  60.3  56.9 
Average Interest Rate, 0.1 b.p. 
  1  2173 2994 2502 1899 1624 1631 1424 
  2  2258 2973 2478 2073 1864 1610 1343 
  3-4  2170 2967 2465 1948 1808 1522 1380 
  5  or  more  2193 3084 2540 2085 1679 1474 1184 
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Table  13  Determinants  of  Collateral 
Variables 
Probit 
(GUAR, RATE exogenous) 
Probit by Full MLE 
(RATE endogenous) 
Probit by two-step MLE 
(GUAR, RATE endogenous) 
 coefficient (z-value)  (p-value) coefficient (z-value) (p-value) coefficient (z-value)  (p-value)
Terms of loan contracts 
  GUAR  0.800  ( 12.11 )  ( 0.000 ) 0.685  ( 9.43 )  ( 0.000 ) 6.034 ( 3.21 )  ( 0.001 )
  RATE  0.00013  ( 4.85 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.00082  ( -15.66 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.00350 ( -1.65 )  ( 0.099 )
Riskiness of Borrower 
  SCORE  -0.004  ( -0.73 )  ( 0.468 ) -0.050  ( -14.23 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.137  ( -1.78 )  ( 0.075 )
  LEV  0.239  ( 2.16 )  ( 0.030 ) 0.205  ( 2.91 )  ( 0.004 ) 0.988  ( 1.61 )  ( 0.108 )
  PROFMARG  -0.390  ( -0.81 )  ( 0.420 )       4.983  ( 1.82 )  ( 0.069 )
  CASHRATIO  0.427  ( 2.78 )  ( 0.005 )       0.323  ( 0.85 )  ( 0.395 )
  LOGSALES  0.048  ( 1.65 )  ( 0.098 )       -0.228  ( -0.69 )  ( 0.489 )
Screening and monitoring by the lender 
  NPL  -0.526  ( -0.61 )  ( 0.540 )       5.766  ( 1.23 )  ( 0.217 )
  DOCFREQ  -0.181  ( -7.00 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.188  ( -9.37 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.633  ( -2.11 )  ( 0.035 )
Relationship between borrower and lender 
  LOG 
(DURATION) 
0.388  ( 11.48 )  ( 0.000 ) 0.139  ( 3.01 )  ( 0.003 ) 0.274  ( 1.66 )  ( 0.096 )
  SCOPE  0.090  ( 5.29 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.013  ( -0.86 )  ( 0.387 ) -0.070  ( -0.86 )  ( 0.392 )
  BANKS  0.003  ( 0.33 )  ( 0.742 ) 0.007  ( 1.20 )  ( 0.232 ) 0.088  ( 1.46 )  ( 0.145 )
  ONEBANK  -0.074  ( -0.85 )  ( 0.398 )       0.743  ( 1.80 )  ( 0.071 )
Other variables 
  MATURITY  -0.483  ( -5.62 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.466  ( -7.28 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.351  ( -1.02 )  ( 0.306 )
  LANDRATIO  3.323  ( 13.38 )  ( 0.000 ) 1.289  ( 3.68 )  ( 0.000 ) 1.688  ( 2.25 )  ( 0.025 )







   2243    
Log  likelihood  -1544.746   -40042.165        
Wald test 
statistics 
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Table 14    Determinants of Personal Guarantees 
Variables 
Probit 
(COLL, RATE exogenous) 
Probit by Full MLE 
(RATE endogenous) 
Probit by two-step MLE 
(COLL, RATE endogenous) 
 coefficient  (z-value)  (p-value) coefficient (z-value) (p-value) coefficient (z-value) (p-value)
Terms of loan contracts 
  COLL  0.582 ( 6.28 )  ( 0.000 ) 0.545 ( 3.68 )  ( 0.000 ) 0.915  ( 1.07 )  ( 0.286 )
  RATE  0.00009 ( 1.74 )  ( 0.081 ) -0.00085 ( -2.50 )  ( 0.012 ) -0.00122  ( -0.67 )  ( 0.504 )
Riskiness of Borrower 
  SCORE  0.002  ( 0.31 )  ( 0.754 ) -0.030  ( -2.30 )  ( 0.021 ) -0.043  ( -0.65 )  ( 0.516 )
  LEV  0.129  ( 0.74 )  ( 0.458 ) 0.276  ( 1.99 )  ( 0.047 ) 0.409  ( 0.85 )  ( 0.393 )
  PROFMARG  -0.413  ( -0.59 )  ( 0.555 ) 0.589  ( 0.83 )  ( 0.409 ) 0.783  ( 0.37 )  ( 0.709 )
  CASHRATIO  -0.270  ( -1.62 )  ( 0.105 ) -0.213  ( -1.41 )  ( 0.159 ) -0.338  ( -1.65 )  ( 0.099 )
  LOGSALES  -0.338  ( -7.44 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.379  ( -6.26 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.580  ( -1.63 )  ( 0.102 )
Screening and monitoring by the lender 
  NPL  -2.445  ( -1.89 )  ( 0.059 ) -0.280  ( -0.17 )  ( 0.864 ) -0.659  ( -0.23 )  ( 0.816 )
  DOCFREQ  -0.145  ( -3.84 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.233  ( -8.11 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.348  ( -1.04 )  ( 0.296 )
Relationship between borrower and lender 
  LOGDURATION  -0.048  ( -0.81 )  ( 0.421 ) -0.088  ( -1.87 )  ( 0.061 ) -0.139  ( -1.30 )  ( 0.195 )
  SCOPE  0.082  ( 3.47 )  ( 0.001 ) 0.040  ( 1.06 )  ( 0.289 ) 0.066  ( 2.03 )  ( 0.042 )
  BANKS  0.004  ( 0.28 )  ( 0.782 ) 0.024  ( 1.83 )  ( 0.067 ) 0.034  ( 0.69 )  ( 0.492 )
  ONEBANK  -0.414  ( -2.84 )  ( 0.004 ) -0.226  ( -1.16 )  ( 0.244 ) -0.375  ( -1.89 )  ( 0.059 )
Other variables 
  MATURITY  -0.438  ( -3.27 )  ( 0.001 ) -0.331  ( -2.00 )  ( 0.045 ) -0.511  ( -1.45 )  ( 0.148 )
  OWNERRATIO  0.158  ( 7.55 )  ( 0.000 ) 0.126  ( 2.73 )  ( 0.006 ) 0.196  ( 2.00 )  ( 0.045 )
constant  4.524  ( 5.88 )  ( 0.000 ) 8.786  ( 10.54 )  ( 0.000 ) 13.084  ( 1.04 )  ( 0.297 )
 
# of observations  2294      2243      2243     
Log likelihood  -736.17755      -19052.302          
Wald test 
statistics       2.37  prob=0.1235   2.35  prob=0.3095   
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Table  15  Determinants  of  Interest  Rates 
Variables 
OLS 
(COLL, GUAR exogenous) 
First step estimation in Full 
MLE in COLL equation 
First step estimation in two-step 
MLE in COLL equation 
 coefficient  (t-value)  (p-value) coefficient (z-value) (p-value) coefficient  (t-value) (p-value)
Terms of loan contracts 
  COLL  200.615  ( 4.59 )  ( 0.000 )            
  GUAR  145.04030  ( 3.13 )  ( 0.002 ) 414.82820 ( 9.51 ) ( 0.000 )      
Riskiness of Borrower 
  SCORE  -35.318  ( -11.44 )  ( 0.000 ) -54.940 ( -20.42 ) ( 0.000 ) -35.100  ( -9.55 )  ( 0.000 )
  LEV  165.056  ( 2.66 )  ( 0.008 ) 123.248 ( 1.95 ) ( 0.051 ) 236.323  ( 2.91)  ( 0.004 )
  PROFMARG  645.546  ( 2.44 )  ( 0.015 )       997.626  ( 2.93)  ( 0.003 )
  CASHRATIO  -155.009  ( -2.31 )  ( 0.021 )       -33.034  ( -0.40 )  ( 0.691 )
  LOGSALES  -216.849  ( -12.81 )  ( 0.000 )       -192.818  ( -8.84 )  ( 0.000 )
Screening and monitoring by the lender 
  NPL  1,500.960  ( 2.95 )  ( 0.003 )       1304.938  ( 2.13)    ( 0.033 )
  DOCFREQ  -170.002  ( -11.80 )  ( 0.000 ) -127.848 ( -9.07 ) ( 0.000 ) -164.908  ( -9.43 )  ( 0.000 )
Relationship between borrower and lender 
  LOGDURATION  -5.633  ( -0.22 )  ( 0.823 ) 29.463 ( 1.17 ) ( 0.240 ) -24.862  ( -0.76 )  ( 0.445 )
  SCOPE  -27.361  ( -2.75 )  ( 0.006 ) -50.774 ( -5.27 ) ( 0.000 ) -9.455  ( -0.78 )  ( 0.434 )
  BANKS  19.050  ( 3.37 )  ( 0.001 ) 3.076 ( 0.58 ) ( 0.561 ) 24.823  ( 3.70)    ( 0.000 )
  ONEBANK  -58.537  ( -1.05 )  ( 0.296 )       46.831  ( 0.63)    ( 0.530 )
Other variables 
  MATURITY  -91.799  ( -1.70 )  ( 0.090 ) -301.796 ( -5.61 ) ( 0.000 ) -100.960  ( -1.48 )  ( 0.139 )
  FIRMAGE  -1.914  ( -2.18 )  ( 0.029 ) -5.133 ( -5.64 ) ( 0.000 ) -1.217  ( -1.14 )  ( 0.253 )
  HHI  0.021  ( 1.33 )  ( 0.182 ) 0.005 ( 0.48 ) ( 0.628 ) 0.011  ( 0.55)    ( 0.584 )
  CITYSHARE  220.551  ( 1.94 )  ( 0.052 ) -53.311 ( -0.80 ) ( 0.421 ) 166.014  ( 1.19)    ( 0.233 )
  LANDRATIO        -66.084 ( -0.55 ) ( 0.584 ) -38.709  ( -0.26 )  ( 0.798 )
  OWNERRATIO            40.576  (  3.56)    (  0.000  )
constant  7,100.074  ( 25.64 )  ( 0.000 ) 5,679.272 ( 28.68 ) ( 0.000 ) 6642.338  ( 18.47)    ( 0.000 )
 
# of observations  4278      4590      2243     
Adj. R-squared  0.2791        0.3008    
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 coefficient  (z-value)  (p-value) coefficient (z-value) (p-value) coefficient  (z-value) (p-value)
Terms of loan contracts 
  COLL        0.477 ( 4.24 ) ( 0.000 ) 218.460  ( 4.46 )  ( 0.000 )
  GUAR  0.663  ( 8.18 )  ( 0.000 )       87.105  ( 1.86 )  ( 0.064 )
  RATE  0.00025  ( 4.65 )  ( 0.000 ) 0.00005 ( 0.80 ) ( 0.424 )      
Riskiness of Borrower 
  SCORE  0.001  ( 0.14 )  ( 0.892 ) 0.006  ( 0.66 ) ( 0.509 ) -25.206  ( -6.63 )  ( 0.000 )
  LEV  0.098  ( 0.75 )  ( 0.456 ) 0.146  ( 0.72 ) ( 0.470 ) 56.025  ( 0.87 )  ( 0.387 )
  PROFMARG  0.242  ( 0.34 )  ( 0.736 ) -0.349  ( -0.45 ) ( 0.653 ) 192.067  ( 0.65 )  ( 0.518 )
  CASHRATIO  0.252  ( 1.46 )  ( 0.145 ) -0.214  ( -1.17 ) ( 0.244 ) 29.125  ( 0.40 )  ( 0.691 )
  LOGSALES  0.065  ( 1.61 )  ( 0.108 ) -0.324  ( -5.48 ) ( 0.000 ) -133.147  ( -6.24 )  ( 0.000 )
Screening and monitoring by the lender 
  NPL  -0.689  ( -0.54 )  ( 0.588 ) -2.180  ( -1.31 ) ( 0.190 ) 2,125.051  ( 3.15 )  ( 0.002 )
  DOCFREQ  -0.141  ( -3.57 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.069  ( -1.40 ) ( 0.162 ) -100.043  ( -5.02 )  ( 0.000 )
Relationship between borrower and lender 
  LOG(DURATION)  0.413  ( 8.00 )  ( 0.000 ) 0.081  ( 1.08 ) ( 0.281 ) -24.129  ( -0.74 )  ( 0.458 )
  SCOPE  0.085  ( 3.62 )  ( 0.000 ) 0.043  ( 1.46 ) ( 0.144 ) -22.464  ( -1.81 )  ( 0.071 )
  BANKS  0.006  ( 0.38 )  ( 0.703 ) 0.000  ( 0.01 ) ( 0.994 ) 9.883  ( 1.20 )  ( 0.228 )
  ONEBANK  -0.041  ( -0.34 )  ( 0.736 ) -0.432  ( -2.38 ) ( 0.017 ) 2.759  ( 0.04 )  ( 0.968 )
Other variables 
  MATURITY  -0.607  ( -5.11 )  ( 0.000 ) -0.258  ( -1.56 ) ( 0.118 ) -108.607  ( -1.68 )  ( 0.094 )
  LANDRATIO  3.670  ( 10.13 )  ( 0.000 )            
  OWNERRATIO        0.182  ( 6.92 ) ( 0.000 )      
  FIRMAGE          -2.338  (  -2.14  )  (  0.033  )
  HHI              0.031  ( 1.48 )  ( 0.139 )
  CITYSHARE              192.811  ( 1.27 )  ( 0.203 )
constant  -2.867  ( -4.09 )  ( 0.000 ) 3.252  ( 3.27 ) ( 0.001 ) 5,006.312  ( 14.06 )  ( 0.000 )
 
# of observations  1786      976      1753     
Log likelihood / 
Adj. R-squared  -790.20793    -475.10355     0.1824     
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Table 17    Use Rate of Collateral, Personal Guarantees and Average Interest Rates: 
By the Usage of Government-Sponsored Credit Guarantees 
  TSR Credit Scores 
 
Total 
-49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 
Percentage of borrowers using Credit 
Guarantees 
51.7 79.1 68.8 52.0 31.9 18.1  6.5 
Users of Credit Guarantees 
 
Percentage of Borrowers with 
Collateral 
86.9 86.2 86.0 87.1 89.3 90.4  100.0 
 
Percentage of Borrowers with Personal 
Guarantees 
94.6 94.4 95.2 94.2 94.2 93.6 91.7 
  Average Interest Rate, 0.1 b.p.  2592  3145  2692  2268  2061  1971  1788 
Non-users of Credit Guarantees 
 
Percentage of Borrowers with 
Collateral 
60.0 58.8 61.7 62.0 59.5 59.1 52.9 
 
Percentage of Borrowers with Personal 
Guarantees 
56.6 59.3 59.0 61.1 54.3 53.1 48.8 
  Average Interest Rate, 0.1 b.p.  1673  2356  1984  1680  1561  1417  1260 
 